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keepers themselves?"," Holt exemplifies an increasing willingness by courts
to use the full extent of their powers to protect the rights of convicts.
And though the eighth amendment should not be used as a vehicle for
judicial imposition of modern penal reforms, it seems to be an adequate
basis for setting minimum standards of decency below which no man,
convict or not, will be forced to sink.
Paul D. Schoonover
A New Liability for Government Contractors
An employee of M. 0. Seckinger Company was injured while installing
steam pipes at the Paris Island Marine Depot in South Carolina under a
contract between Seckinger and the United States. After receiving work-
men's compensation' payments from Seckinger, he sued the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act,' alleging that the Government's negli-
gence was the sole and proximate cause of his injuries. The United States
sought to implead Seckinger as a joint tortfeasor, but the trial court
dismissed the third-party complaint without prejudice. The trial court
found that the negligence of the Government was the sole cause of the
employee's injuries, and awarded him $45,000. The United States did not
appeal this judgment, but paid it and sued Seckinger, seeking indemnifica-
tion based on a contract clause which provided that Seckinger would be
liable for all damages to persons or property that occurred as a result of
its fault or negligence in connection with the prosecution of the work.
The trial court dismissed the complaint because (1) the suit was barred by
res judicata, and (2) the responsibility clause could not be construed to
allow indemnification for the indemnitee's own negligence.! On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit rejected the trial court's first ground of decision, but
agreed with the second.' It reasoned that, in view of the prior action,
the Government was necessarily seeking indemnification for its own negli-
gence. Noting that federal law controls the interpretation of contracts to
which the United States is a party, the court adopted, as the federal rule,
the "majority rule" that intent to indemnify for the indemnitee's own
negligence must be clear and unequivocal. Finding no such expression
of intent, the court concluded that no indemnification could be required."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.! Held, reversed and
""Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?," D. JUVENAL, SATIRES, VI, line 347.
'S.C. CODE ANN. 55 72-121 to -128 (1962) (55 72-123 to -126 were repealed in 1969, and
5 72-126.1 was added).
228 U.S.C. §5 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1969).
'This is the holding of the trial court as given in United States v. Seckinger, 408 F.2d 146,
148-49 (5th Cir. 1969).
'408 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1969).
51d. at 153.
'United States v. Seckinger, 396 U.S. 815 (1969). In its petition for certiorari, the Govern-
ment advised the Court that there were over 200 cases pending involving the same or similar
clauses. Government Petition for Certiorari at 7, United States v. Seckinger, supra.
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remanded: The responsibility clause calls for indemnity on the basis of
comparative negligence; therefore, the United States is entitled to recover
from the contractor that portion of the damages caused by the contractor's
negligence. United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 204 (1970).
I. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION UNDER FEDERAL LAW
Scope of the Federal Common Law. In Hinderlider v. La Plata River f§
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., a case decided on the same day as Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins,' the Supreme Court recognized that federal common law con-
trols in non-diversity actions.9 In the absence of a constitutional rule of
decision or congressional directive, federal courts "are free to apply the
traditional common-law technique of decision and to draw upon sources
of the common law"'" in fashioning their own rule of decision. A federal
court will often examine the laws and decisions of the various states in
its search for a uniform federal rule." If the federal interest is not substan-
tial and there is no particular need for uniformity, a federal court may
choose the law of the forum state as the applicable law in federal courts
of that state."'
Rules of Contract Interpretation. Federal law controls interpretation of
contracts to which the United States is a party." Among the federal
common-law principles applied to contract interpretation is the maxim
that a contract should be most strongly construed against the drafter. 4
This maxim becomes particularly important when there exists a vast
difference in the bargaining power of the parties, and the contract was
drawn by the stronger party." Another maxim of federal common law
7304 U.S. 92 (1938).
8304 U.S. 64 (1938). Under Erie substantive law of the forum state, not federal general
common law, controls in diversity actions.
' Generally, federal common law will control in cases involving a federal interest that might
be compromised by adjudication in a state court applying state law. See, e.g., United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S.
29 (1956). Some of the more important areas in which federal common law controls are cases
that: (1) arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States (D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942)); (2) involve a substantial federal
interest in uniformity of law (Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943));
(3) involve matters of essentially federal character (United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S.
301 (1947)); (4) obviously could not be decided by state law, as in disputes between the states
(Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938)); (5) involve
international law (Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)); and (6) arise
under admiralty and maritime jurisdiction (The Thomas Jefferson, 6 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 465
(1825)).
l"D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 465 (1942) (Jackson,
J., concurring). This opinion is frequently cited as an excellent statement of the nature of federal
common law. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 60, at 248 (2d ed. 1970).
"'See, e.g., United States v. Seckinger, 408 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1969).
"United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 357 (1966). Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U.S. 301 (1947), in which the Court found a substantial federal interest in the right of the
United States to reimbursement for loss of services and medical expenses of an injured soldier.
However, the Court left the creation of such a right to Congress, traditionally the guardian of
the nation's funds and property. Id. at 315-17.
"
5United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944).
"
4See United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106 (1944).
"
5 See Calderon v. Atlas S.S. Co., 170 U.S. 272 (1898); Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United
States, 109 Ct. Cl. 390, 418 (1947).
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is that contracts should be interpreted to reflect the intention of the parties
at the time the contract was executed." Federal courts should not allow the
United States any advantage of interpretation that a private party would
not have under the same circumstances,'' and federal courts will not revise
a Government contract on the grounds that a more prudent one might
have been made. 8
Generally, parties have the freedom to include in a contract any legal
provisions that they may desire, including indemnity clauses." A majority
of states" have adopted a restrictive rule with regard to the construction of
indemnity clauses that allegedly require indemnity for the indemnitee's
own negligence."5 This majority rule [hereinafter referred to as the clear-
intent rule] requires that the intention of the parties to include indemni-
fication for the indemnitee's own negligence must be expressed clearly
and unequivocally on the face of the contract."2 The clear-intent rule
is based on the reluctance of courts to allow a negligent indemnitee to
invoke general language of indemnification to recover from a faultless
indemnitor." This desire to protect indemnitors from unforeseen burdens
is illustrated by one federal case which held that although the contract
called for the indemnitor to hold the indemnitee harmless from damages
caused by the indemnitor's negligence, the clause would not be enforce-
able where there was concurrent negligence." However, some courts have
allowed full indemnity under ambiguous clauses, even in the absence of
any indemnity clause, if a contract for indemnity could be implied from
the circumstances."
When the contract in question is a construction contract, the right to
indemnity in the absence of an unambiguous indemnity clause is generally
predicated on the extent of control exercised by each party over the
premises, instrumentalities, and working conditions at the time of the
injury involved." However, if the injury is to an employee of the con-
18Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1914); Canal Co. v. Hill, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 94, 99-100 (1872).
"1United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106, 111 (1944).
'8Id.; United States v. American Sur. Co., 322 U.S. 96, 102 (1944).
'
9 See generally 17 C.J.S. Contracts S 190 (1963).
" Federal courts may adopt state law as a rule of decision. See notes 10-12 supra, and accom-
panying text.
21 See Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 29-38 (1948).
2'41 AM. JuR. 2D Indemnity S 15, at 701 (1968). The process of interpreting such an in-
demnity clause has been described as one in which "the law . . . steps in and tells the parties that
while it need not be done in any particular language or form, unless the intention is unequivocally
expressed in the plainest of words, the law will consider that the parties did not undertake to in-
demnify one against the consequences of his own negligence. The question then is: does the specific
contract in dispute clearly reflect such a purpose?" Batson-Cook Co. v. Industrial Steel Erectors,
257 F.2d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 1958) (emphasis added).
"Associated Eng'rs Inc. v. Job, 370 F.2d 633, 651 (8th Cir. 1966).
24Shamrock Towing Co. v. New York, 16 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1926).
2 See 41 AM. JuR. 20 Indemnity §§ 19, 24 (1968). In Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic
S.S. Co., 350 U.S. 124 (1956), the Court, over a strong dissent, allowed full indemnity implied
from a breach of an implied warranty of workmanlike performance. The Fifth Circuit subsequently
noted that "[T]he implied warranty established in Ryan is a product of the admiralty courts and
a creature of the admiralty law . . . . The cases in which the doctrine has been applied have been
admiralty cases which presented substantially similar circumstances to those existing in Ryan."
Central Strikstof Verkoopkanter v. Walsh Stevedoring Co., 380 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1967).
'See Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 616, 626-32 (1964).
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tractor-indemnitor, and is caused by the active or primary negligence
of the owner-indemnitee, the tendency of most courts has been to deny
indemnity unless the indemnity clause expressly included injuries occa-
sioned by the indemnitee."
The Federal Tort Claims Act and Workmen's Compensation. Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act" [FTCA], which was enacted in 1946, the
sovereign immunity of the United States to suits in tort is waived, and
the United States is generally liable for the torts of its agents if a private
person would be liable under the same circumstances. Congress indicated
that the substantive law to be applied under the FTCA is the law of the
state in which the injury complained of occurred.Y Recognizing the con-
gressional intent to treat the United States as a private party by applying
state tort law, it has been held, under the FTCA, that the United States
may be impleaded as a joint tortfeasor and may be liable for contribution
where local law allows it." The right to and liability for contribution
are governed by local, not federal, law. Approximately one-half of the
states allow contribution among joint tortfeasors either by statute or judi-
cial decision," but South Carolina has not yet followed this trend."
Workmen's compensation statutes, in effect in all of the states, have
substantially altered common-law tort rights and remedies. Generally,
workmen's compensation statutes terminate a private employer's common-
law liability and substitute a duty to pay a prescribed compensation not
based on fault." It is uniformly held that acceptance of a workmen's
compensation award by an injured employee bars any action he might have
at common law against his employer.' A majority of states have also held
that a third-party tortfeasor may not recover contribution from a con-
currently negligent employer, the rationale being that such contribution
would subject the employer to double liability and allow the employee a
double recovery against the employer, contrary to the "sole remedy"
provisions of the workmen's compensation statutes." South Carolina fol-
lows a modified version of this majority rule. If the employer has paid a
workmen's compensation award, a third-party tortfeasor may have the
amount of that award deducted from the judgment prior to paying it;
or, if the employee elected to go against the third party alone and did
17 See Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 663, 752-66 (1969).
2828 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1969).
'928 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1964). Congressional exceptions to this general liability are at
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964).
3028 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
"United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
aaId.; United States v. Arizona, 216 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1954) (state law governs unless the
internal management of the United States is involved in some special way).
"See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 274-75 (3d ed. 1964).
"4The leading case is James v. Western Union Tel. Co., 130 S.C. 533, 126 S.E. 653 (1925).
"W. PROSSER, supra note 33, at 555. These statutes are designed to provide an injured em-
ployee with immediate relief, limit an employer's liability for injury to the amount of the work-
men's compensation award, and avoid the expense and antagonism involved in common law negli-
gence actions. Id.
'"See 58 AM. JuR. Workmen's Compensation § 48 (1948, Supp. 1970); S.C. CODE ANN.
72-121 (1962).
arSee Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 977 (1957) (classifying jurisdictions).
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not collect a compensation award, the third party may force the employer
to contribute an amount not greater than the employer's liability under
workmen's compensation."
The Effect of an Indemnity Contract on the Right to Contribution. In
jurisdictions that do allow contribution among joint tortfeasors, a third-
party tortfeasor is generally not entitled to contribution from a concur-
rently negligent employer who has already paid a workmen's compensation
award."9
Parties to a contract may, however, agree as to who shall bear the risk
of a damage award if either or both are negligent, and an indemnity
agreement providing that the indemnitor shall indemnify the indemnitee
for damages resulting from the indemnitor's own negligence is one way
to insure that the indemnitee will not have to pay entire damages in
jurisdictions that would not allow him to recover contribution.'
If an indemnitee-tortfeasor has paid a judgment obtained by the
injured party, a question arises as to what extent, if any, the indemnitee
is bound by findings of fact in the judgment against him. The authorities
which have considered the collateral estoppel question have uniformly held
that the indemnitee is bound by the judgment for which he seeks indem-
nity, and that he cannot bring an action against the indemnitor if that
prior judgment rests on a fact fatal to recovery under the indemnity
clause.4' In the case of a third-party tortfeasor attempting to recover
from a concurrently negligent employer solely under an indemnity con-
tract, indemnity will generally be allowed if (1) the indemnity clause
does cover and was intended to cover the injury and subsequent liability
involved," and (2) the action by the indemnitee against the indemnitor
is not barred by a finding of fact fatal to recovery.
II. THE RESPONSIBILITY CLAUSE
U.S. Standard Form No. 23-Rev., the required form for Government
fixed-price construction contracts, provides in article 10:
"'S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-121 to -128 (1962) (statutory scheme); Burns v. Carolina Power &
Light Co., 88 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.S.C. 1950), aff'd, 193 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 863 (1952); cf. Simon v. Strock, 209 S.C. 134, 39 S.E.2d 209 (1946) (payment of award
relieves employer of further liability and bars any other action against him). The South Carolina
supreme court has indicated that decisions of the North Carolina supreme court in point are en-
titled to great respect, as the South Carolina workmen's compensation statute was closely patterned
on that of North Carolina. Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 73 S.E.2d 449 (1952). North Carolina
follows the majority rule. See note 37 supra, and accompanying text. Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C.
663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1953).
"'See, e.g., Bertone v. Turco Prods., 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958) (applying New Jersey law);
Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953). Denial of
contribution in such a case is usually based on the theory that a contribution defendant must be
originally liable to the injured party, and original liability of an employer to an injured employee
does not exist under workmen's compensation. See notes 35-36 supra, and accompanying text.4 See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Contribution S 2 (1964).
4See cases collected in Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 329 (1952, Supp. 1970). This is an exception to
the general rule that a prior judgment is not res judicata unless both parties were parties or privies
to that prior suit. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 111 (1948). See generally 46 AM. JuR. 2D
Judgments S 521 (1969).
'See, e.g., Batson-Cook v. Industrial Steel Erectors, 257 F.2d 410 (Sth Cir. 1958); Herman
Chanen Constr. Co. v. Guy Apple Masonry Co., 9 Ariz. App. 445, 453 P.2d 541 (1969).
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The contractor shall, without additional expense to the government, obtain
all licenses and permits required for the prosecution of the work. He shall be
responsible for all damages to persons or property that occur as a result of his
fault or negligence in connection with the prosecution of the work. He shall
also be responsible for all materials delivered and work performed until com-
pletion and final acceptance ....
This clause first appeared in Government fixed-price construction con-
tracts in 1938," and the regulations now in force are essentially similar.'
The scope of the responsibility clause was considered in United States
v. Has kins.' There, the trial court found that the Government's negligence
proximately caused or contributed to the death of one of the contractor's
employees. The Tenth Circuit, speaking of the responsibility clause, held
that "[t]he language does not embrace the concept of liability for the
government's negligence,""' and denied the Government any indemnity
from the contractor. In interpreting the clause, the court relied heavily
on the intent of the Colorado legislature to limit the amount of an
employer's liability to the workmen's compensation award.' In effect,
the Haskins court held that for purposes of the responsibility clause, the
employer's payment of a workmen's compensation award extinguished
any other liability for the injury. In Maloof v. United States the construc-
tion contract contained both the responsibility clause and a comprehensive
"hold-harmless" clause."' The district court in Maloof held that "Clause
2 [the hold-harmless clause] is the indemnity agreement.""0 The court
allowed indemnity based on that clause, impliedly rejecting indemnity
based only on the responsibility clause. 1 In Fisher v. United States" and
United States v. Accrocco' the Government was allowed full indemnity
under the responsibility clause, based on a finding of fact that the negli-
gence of the contractor was a proximate cause of the employee's injuries.
A similar contract clause in Porello v. United States provided that
"[t]he stevedore [Porello] ...shall be responsible for any and all dam-
age or injury to persons and cargo ... [and] to any ship . .. [occurring]
through the negligence or fault of the Stevedore, his employees, and
servants." 4 Porello's employee was injured through the concurring negli-
gence of the company and the Government. He received compensation
payments for his injuries, then sued the United States under the Public
Vessels Acte' and obtained a judgment for damages. The United States
sought indemnity from Porello under the contract clause, but the Supreme
4344 C.F.R. 5 54.1(c), 54.13 art. 10 (Supp. 1957) (emphasis added).
4441 C.F.R. 5 11.1, 11.3, 12.23 art. 10 (1938).
4 3See 41 C.F.R. 5§ 1-16.401, 1-16.402, 1-16.404, 1-16.901-23A art. 12 (1970).
46395 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1968).471d. at 508.
4s Id.
49242 F. Supp. 175, 186 (D. Md. 1965).
50 id.
51 Id. See also La Sanka v. United States, 346 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1965).
52299 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
53 297 F. Supp. 966 (D.D.C. 1969). The contract in question in Accrocco provided for stringent
safety precautions on the part of the contractor.
54330 U.S. 446, 457 (1947).
'Public Vessels Act of 1925, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1969).
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Court declined to decide the claim without evidence regarding the inten-
tion of the parties as to the meaning of the clause."
11. UNITED STATES V. SECKINGER
In United States v. Seckinger the Supreme Court held that the responsi-
bility clause entitled the Government to indemnity on the basis of com-
parative negligence. The majority stated that such a holding was appropri-
ate because: (1) the interpretation was consistent with the plain language
of the clause; (2) the clear-intent rule would be preserved intact, as
each party would be held responsible for the damages caused by its own
negligence; and (3) the interpretation was the least favorable to the
Government, considering all reasonable and practical constructions, and
thus followed the maxim that a contract should be most strongly con-
strued against the drafter. Declining to remand for a determination of
the intent of the parties as the Court had done in Porello, the majority
stated that "there is not only no representation that further proceedings
would aid in clarifying the intentions of the parties, but there is at least
tacit agreement that the background of the clause has been explored
as thoroughly as possible. In these circumstances, we have no alternative
but to proceed directly to the contractual construction problem."5
Thus, the majority avoided any problem of reconciling their interpre-
tation of the responsibility clause with the probable intent of the parties
at the time it was executed, contrary to the object in interpretation of
ambiguous contract clauses.5" The majority, in effect, disregarded this
controlling principle of contract interpretation, and proceeded to discuss
the desirability of alternate interpretations of the clause.
In so doing, the Court agreed with the Government's argument that
denial of indemnity would deprive the clause of any sensible meaning, and
agreed that the clause could only reasonably be construed to require either
full or partial indemnity. This rationale fails for two reasons. First,
the clause could easily have been construed to require indemnity for any
damages except those to an employee of the contractor. This construction
would allow for the contractor's reasonable expectation that his liability
for such an injury would be limited by workmen's compensation."'
.. More importantly, in pre-FTCA context, the majority itself admits
that "the purpose of the clause is totally unclear."' The majority does
not explain how the passage of the FTCA made clear the meaning of a
clause which had appeared eight years earlier. Prior to 1946, the United
States could not be sued in tort, and consequently had no reason to secure
for itself the right to recover against an alleged joint-tortfeasor.' Justice
Stewart, in a dissent joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Douglas,
stated that "[f]or more than 30 years it has evidently been understood
330 U.S. at 458.
7 7 U.S. at 209.
58.See notesr 13-18 supra, and accompanying text.
59 See note 38 supra, and accompanying text.
"0 397 U.S. at 208.
" Id. at 220 (dissenting opinion).
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that these words [of the responsibility clause] mean what they rather
clearly say-that the contractor cannot hold the Government for losses
he incurs resulting from his own negligence." ' Disagreeing with the ma-
jority's assumption that the meaning of the clause suddenly became clear
with the passage of the FTCA, Justice Stewart continued:
Yet we are asked to believe that the drafter of this clause was so prescient
as to foresee the day of government tort liability nearly a decade in the future,
and so ingenious as to smuggle a provision into a standard contract form that
would, when that day arrived, allow the Government to shift its liability
onto the backs of its contractors. This theory is nothing short of incredible. 3
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, as the ultimate arbiter of the federal common law,
undeniably has the power to determine and apply rules for the interpreta-
tion of Government contracts. In Seckinger the Court recognized the
controlling principles of contract interpretation, but failed to apply those
principles in reaching its decision. The majority accepted the Government's
argument that denial of recovery would make the clause meaningless,
after asserting that prior to the FTCA the clause was effectively meaning-
less. The dissent pointed to an interpretation that would have been reason-
able both before and after the passage of the FTCA, as well as consistent
with the probable intent of the parties. The majority did not even attempt
to explain how the parties could have intended the clause to have the
meaning found by the Court. The history of the clause and Seckinger's
coverage under workmen's compensation make it highly improbable that
either party intended the clause to allow any indemnity on the facts
of the case. In the absence of proof of contrary intention, the maxim
of construction most strongly against the drafter would seem to require
that the Court deny indemnity as a matter of law."
The Court indicated that it adopted the clear-intent rule on indemnifi-
cation for the indemnitee's own negligence. However, it did not explain
how the Government, held to be the sole cause of the damages in a prior,
unappealed judgment, could possibly be seeking indemnification for other
than its own judicially determined negligence. The Court ignored the
fact that the finding of sole cause would bar any action under the
responsibility clause in every state or federal court that has considered
the question." The Court avoided the problem of the prior judgment by
stating that "[w]e do not pause to consider what effect, if any, under
all the circumstances of this case, the South Carolina judgment could
properly have in the instant case." By declining to consider the effect
of the prior judgment, the Court implicitly held that it was not binding,
and effectively reversed a decision that the Government had failed to
appeal.
o2Id. at 218.
63 1d. at 220.
6See notes 13-18 supra, and accompanying text.
65 See note 41 supra, and accompanying text.
"397 U.S. at 205-06 n.4.
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